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I would like to begin with a discussion of the competitive environment facing banks today and then
continue with a financial analysis of the dynamics which are driving so many bank mergers and acquisitions.
Today, banks are facing disintermediation from increased competition on all fronts.' Larger players in the
industry with economies of scale tend to receive the greatest benefit fin technological advances, particularly in the
use of computers. For the List twenty years, legal barriers to expansion and acquisition have been falling down both
geographicaIV and by product line Furthenore, in the last five years, market dynamics and the pricing cycle
favor bank acquisitions. Today banks are relatively profitable and have strong asset quality, however, they have
• This speech was part of a symposium held at Fordham University School of Law on March 12, 1996 entitled
M & A: Survival of the Fittest in the 21st Century, Strategic Positioning in the Banking and Communications
Industries.
". Neil McCarthy is Vice President in the Financial Institutions Group at Bear Stearns where he works on
corporate finance and advisory assignments for banks and other financial institutions in the United States, Latin America
and Asia. Previously an attorney specializing in mergers and acquisitions and securities and regulatory matters for
banks and savings institutions with the Office of Thrift Supervision of the United States Treasury Department, Skadden,
Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom in New York and Binghar, Dana & Gould in Boston. He has a B.A. from Bowdoin
College and a i.D. from Harvard Law School.
1 Technology May Usurp Investment Banker Skills-HSBC, REUTERS LTD., June 25, 1996. The article
defines disintermediation as, "a process where issuers borrow directly from investors, bypassing banks." Id.
2 Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338
(1994) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (1994)) (amending Douglas Amendment prohibitions on interstate
banking and permitting states to allow interstate branching) [hereinafter Riegle-Neal Act]; see also Northeast Bancorp,
Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 472 U.S. 159 (1985) (permitting interstate banking through
regional compacts).
12 C.F.R. § 225.25 (1996) [61 FR 14464] (providing the current "laundry list' of permissible nonbanking
activities).
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relatively low growth prospects.4 The confluence of all these factors has been driving the rapid rate of bank
consolidations in the last five years s
I DSTERwELD7oN
Typically banks act as the middleman in financial services. They originate financial products by ta ing
money in as deposits and other borrowings, and putting that money out as loans, thus serving as the intermediary
between depositor and borrower. 6 In doing so banks serve as a credit check on borrowers. They also process
transactions through the payment system.
Banks used to have an exclusive ability to deliver these services as a "bundle." Today customers no
longer need the services as a "bundle?' as specialized companies who are able to provide some of these services
more competitively are increasingly taking business away from banks.7 For example, by almost any measure, GE
Capital is one of the ten largest financial institutions in the country!
4 See, eg., James R. Kraus, Buyouts, Belt-Tightening Bolster East Coast Banks, AM. BANKER, Apr. 24,
1996, According to this article, "[ffirst-quarter [1996] earnings climbed at midsize banks across the Northeast and
Middle Atlantic states, spurred by acquisitions and cost controls," in line with analysts' expectations with underlying
fimdamentals looking good. Id.
5 Steven Lipin, Joining Fortunes: Chemical and Chase Set $10 Billion Merger, Forming Biggest Bank,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 1995, at Al (indicating that the Chemical-Chase bank deal, the largest ever, came at a time of
quickening consolidation in the banking industry as companies search for ways to cut costs, or seek out new business
lines or territories). "It also comes at a time of weakening earnings growth for many banks amid signs that revenue
growth will be increasingly difficult to find." Id.
6 See generally James R. Smoot, Financial Institutions Reform in the Wake of VALIC, 29 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 691, 692 n.5 (1996) (defining banks as institutions engaged in taking deposits and making loans); Id at 694
(indicating that banks underwrite the credit risk of their borrowers).
7 A. William Schenck 3d, Comment: Consumers, Not Wall Street, Driving Bank Mergers, AM. BANKER, May
30, 1996, at 4 (indicating that in the early 1980's, banks held about 50% of the financial assets in the U.S., but today,
barely hold one-third). According to this comment, "[tfhe biggest impact on bank deposits in the last twenty years
resulted from high returns offered by investment products, cash management accounts, money market funds, mutual
funds, and securities." Id
8 Juliana Ratner, GE Capital Buys Servicing Porfolios from AmSouth and Wachovia, AM. BANKER, Apr,
17, 1995, at 12 (reporting a race between GE Capital and Countrywide Credit Industries for the number one rank in
mortgage servicing business).
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A. Money Management
Ageneration ago, it was hard to do much with yourmoney except to put it into a bank deposit. 9 Wall
Street and others, however, have come up with lots of ways to compete with banks for funds. Most notably,
money market flmds,W largely an innovation ofthe 1970's, compete directly with bank deposits for customers
interested in short or long-term interest-earnings accounts."
B. Business Lending
Today, businesses are funding themselves without banks, unlike a generation ago. In the past even Lag
investment grade corporations would automatically go to a bank for a loan when they needed funds. This is no
longer true. Changes in the way securities laws work, particularly the shelf-registration provision of Rule 430(a),
allow these companies to raise funds directly through the use of publicly traded debt and commercial paper without
the need for banks as middlemen.12 Many of these corporations have higher credit ratings than the typical money
center bank, and can raise funds more cheaply.13 Another innovation of the 1980's was high yield debt ('juk
bonds"). Now large non-investment grade companies can also raise funds directly without having to rely on a bank
for a loan. Banks used to have a clear competitive edge in small business lending;, but this is no longer the case.
9 James McCormick, Transforming Banks into Capital-Efficient Intermediaries, AM. BANKER, Sept. 20,
1985 (stating that banks once held an oligopolistic position in bank deposits and other intermediary service which were
ostensibly protected by regulation, but has now been eroded by competition and healthy innovation from nonbank
competitors).
10 Current Conditions Necessitate Interstate Expansion, AM. BANKER, Apr. 14, 1986 (explaining how
securities firms have lured deposits away from banks through the offering of money market funds).
11Karen Kahler Holliday, Will BankMergers Destroy Customer Loyalty?, U.S. BANKER, Oct. 1, 1995, at 30.
According to this article, consumers "have bypassed bank certificates of deposit and savings accounts for mutual funds.
. ." Id.; James P. Kraus, The Worlds Largest Banks, AM. BANKER, July 29, 1993 (indicating that depositors are
moving their funds into mutual funds to capitalize on higher rates of return).
12 John C. Coffee, Jr., Article: Re-Engineering Corporate Disclosure: The Coming Debate over Company
Registration, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1143 (1995), The article states that shelf registration is a "system under which
issuers can obtain quick access to the capital markets by incorporating by reference '34 Act filings." Id., at 1145.
13 See, eg., Smoot, supra note 6, at 697. According this article, "the commercial paper market has enabled the
American businesses to sell their instruments of indebtedness directly to persons and entities with savings available for
investment." Id.
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The MONEY Store, a non-bank specialty finance company, for example, is now the largest issuer of Small
Business Administration ("SBA") loans in the country.
14
C ConsumerLending
Banks also had a competitive advantage in the 1980's in residential mortgages. Trouble arose when they
found out how illiquid and interest-rate sensitive the assets were. Today, banks are facing competition in residential
mortgage lending from government-sponsored enterprises (GNMA, FNMA, and FHLMC), specialized mortgage
banks such as Countrywide, and large non-banks' 5
In auto loans, banks compete with the finance subsidiaries of auto manufacturers (so-called "captives"),
and specialized companies, like Olympic 6 and Mercury. 7 The captives have an incentive to provide favorable
financing to "push metal" for their parent companies. The specialized companies have proven to be highly
effective marketers. As a result, banks have had a declining market share of auto finance. Banks have also lost
market share in credit cards to specialty companies such as MBNA and First USA.
14 James B. Amdorfer, Nonbanks Getting in on the Fight for Turf, AM. BANKER, Mar. 11, 1996, at 5.
According to this article, banks have been losing their grip as the sole source of credit for small companies, "[i]ndeed,
the country's largest SBA lender isn't even a bank; it's The MONEY Store, a Sacramento, California-based company
that cranked out $403 million in SBA loans." Id.
15 See eg., James H. Sat, Merrill Lynch Finds Brisk Demand for its Secured 100% Mortgages, AM.
BANKER, Nov. 18, 1993, at 10 (indicating that Merrill achieved more than $1.5 billion in originations during 1993).
16 John R. Engen, Hard Driving Auto Lender Battles the Banks, AM. BANKER, Aug. 23, 1995, at 5 (noting
that Olympic Financial Ltd., is the nation's third largest securitizer of auto receivables with 14 hubs and 31 spokes
covering 31 states).
17 Gordon Matthews, Mercury Financial Seen as Bargain After Selloff Spurred by Rate Rises, AM. BANKER,
Jan. 31, 1995, at 24 (indicating that Mercury, which focuses on loans to buyers of used cars, grew rapidly after its spin-
off from First Illinois Corp.).
18 See Engen, supra note 16. According to this article, Mr. Mack, CEO of Olympic Financial Ltd., is of the
opinion that "banks miss the boat on auto loans. They typically demand 20% downpayments - often required by the
regulators ... [and] try to lend in places where they lack a presence." Id.; see also Matthews, supra note 17.
According to the article, 'Mercury... focuses on loans to buyers of used cars, a specialized sphere of consumer finance
generally shunned by banks because of the high risk borrowers involved." Id.
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D. Secuwiizatn
Much of the change in consumer lending has been driven by securitization. Non-bank financial
companies can fund mortgages, auto loans and credit cards without the need for deposit-Caking branches by
securitizing the loans they originate as mortgage- or asset- backed securities. The impact of securitization is
possi.bly the most significant development in finance over the last decade. More than one half of all mortgages in
this country are secntzed, for example.19
H TECHNOLOGY
Advances in technology have continued to revolutionize banking. Computers continue to allow for more
efficient information processing with economies of scale. ATMs have changed the way we all handle cash. Credit
card companies could not do ten years ago what they routinely do today with point of sale terminals to verify
purchases and cash advances.
We are on the verge of cyber-cash on the Intemet. 2 In five or ten years, banking and financial services
could largely be done in a radically different way. There will be an emphasis on economies of scale which create
competitive advantages for larger companies that ultimately leads to third party "outsourcing" and the reduction or
elimination of the need for certain jobs.2'
19 Peter J. Ferrara, The Regulatory Separation of Bankingfrom Securities and Commerce in the Modern
Financial Marketplace, 33 ARIz. L. REv. 583, 595 (1991). Citing FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION,
MANDATE FOR CHANGE: RESTRUCTURING THE BANKING INDUSTRY, 9 (1987). This article states that "[tiwo-thirds of
all new mortgages each year are financed through securities rather than traditional lending." Id.; see also William M.
Isaac, Comment: Government Hobbling Banks in their Fight for Market Share, AM. BANKER, Apr. 2, 1993, at 4
(indicating that securitized home mortgages as a percentage of total home mortgages grew from about 3% in 1972 to
40% in 1992).; Joseph C. Shenker & Anthony J. Colletta, Asset Securitization: Evolution, Current Issues and New
Frontiers, TEx. L. REv., May 1991, 1369, 1373-1375 (defining "securitization").
20 Tanja Lian, Banking on the Internet: Searchingfor a Competitive Edge, BANK MARETI NG, July 1, 1995,
at 34 (indicating that banks are setting up informational world wide web pages yet remain cautious about using the
world wide web as a funds delivery system).
2 See, eg., Edward D. Herlihy et al., The New Aggressive Era in Financial Institutions Mergers &
Acquisitions, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS OF FINANCIAL INSITUTIONS 1995: AN UNPRECEDENTED YEAR OF
CONSOLIDATION. AN ANNUAL REvIEW OF LEADING DEVELOPMENTS (PLI Corporate Law & Practice Course
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III LEGAL BARRIERS
A. GeographicBanrer
A generation ago, banks were kept small by geographic legal barriers?' Historical bias against large banks
dates back to Andrew Jackson. There has been an historic effort in our country to keep banks small and local for
fear of finance and 'Wall Street" Barriers, both at the state and federal level, made it difficult or impossible for
banks to expand beyond their natural geographic region." Change occurred in the 1980's. Lawyers, using
loopholes like bank holding companies and the regional bank compacts, were able to find ways around geographic
barriers.24 Ultimately, these barriers crumbled.
B. Thijs vs. Banks
Banks were barred from owning thrifis (savings and loans) until only recently. Thrifts were a statutory
creation to promote home ownership. Congress allowed thrifts to pay higher rates on deposits but limited them to
making residential mortgages. This arrangement worked well while interest rates remained stable, but then blew
up in the late 1970's and early 1980's from interest rate gyrations.
The initial Congressional response was to allow thrifts to make commercial loans, but still prohibit banks
from buying thrifts. This resulted in a debacle of epic proportions. Banks can now buy thrifts, subject to issues
Handbook Series No. 279, 1995). This article indicates that "Increasing economies of scale and improvement in
technological and distribution efficiencies have been cited as motivating some of the year's biggest transactions, and will
likely plaan increasingly important role in shaping the destiny of all industry participants." Id.
See also John Byre, Sound Off, AM. BANKER, Sept. 24, 1990, at 2. According to this article, "[tihere are
two barriers - geographic and legislative - that must be broken down .... which have fostered the development of a
fragmented banking system." Id.
23 See generally Riegle-Neal Act, supra note 2.
24 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 30 (1996). The Act provides a loophole, known as the "thirty mile rule," which
enables banks to overcome geographic barriers and relocate their corporate headquarters.
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related to sharing the costs for the S&L bailout. In general, the barriers between thrifts and banks have fallen by the
wayside
C Commerew. Banking
Barriers between commerce and banking, however, still continue to exist The Bank Holding Company
Act (BHCA) essentially prohibits banks, defined as an entity that takes deposits and makes commercial loans, from
being owned by industrial companies and vice versa But, the BHCA does not prevent non-bank specialty
companies and institutions like GE Capital, and the captive auto finance companies discussed above from
effectively acting like banks?2 These non-banks only have to limit certain activities to avoid the BHCA. In the
case of GE Capital, for example, it does not take deposits, but instead funds itself in the capital markets and then
competes with banks in lending on almost all fronts.
2 See Mark David Wallace, Comment, Life in the Boardroom After FIRREA: A Revisionist Approach to
Corporate Governance in Insured Depository Institutions, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1187, 1250 (1992). According to
this comment, "thrifts were 'frozen by both statute and regulation! to a one-product business: long-term home mortgage
loans. Eventually, the limitation on thrift activities sank the industry while commercial banks, though also limited,
retained broad enough powers to survive with adequate diversification." Id.
2 Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 56-511, 70 Stat. 133 (1956) (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 1841-50 (1996)). Section 1843(a)(2) states that "no bank holding company shall ... retain, direct or indirect
ownership or control of any voting shares of any company which is not a bank or bank holding company." Id.
i 7 See Charlotte L. Tart, Comment, Expansion of the Banking Industry Under the Riegle-Neal Interstate
Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994: Is the Banking Industry Heading in the Right Direction?, 30 WAKE
FoREsT L. REV. 915, (1995). This comment states that" [t]he banking industry, the traditional provider of deposit and
loan services, has been challenged by nonbank financial service providers that offer alternatives to investment and credit
opportunities without being subject to the banking regulatory environment" Id.
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D. InvesentBankng v Commercila Banking
The Glass-Steagall Act of 193328 separated investment banking activities from commercial banking
activities. Neither entity could be ,primarily engaged" in both commercial loans and the business of underwriting
securities.2 This separation has been significantly breached in recent years.30 The Federal Reserve Board has
reinterpreted the term "primarly engage' 31 and many money center banks, most notably, J.P. Morgan, now
compete with investment banks through so-called "Section 20 subsidiaries.132
28 Glass-Steagall commonly refers to four sections of the Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 66, 48 Stat. 162
(1933) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). The four sections are: § 16, 48 Stat. 184 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 24); § 20, 48 Stat. 188 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 377); § 21, 48 Stat. 189 (codified
as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 378); § 32,48 Stat. 194 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 78).
29 Id § 20, 48 Stat. at 188 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1994)). See also David M. Eaton,
Comment, The Commercial Banking-Related Activities of Investment Banks and Other NonBanks, 44 EMORY L. J.
1187, 1202 (1995). "[Njational banks and state member banks are proscribed bysection 20 from affiliating with any
firm 'engaged principally' in securities underwriting." Id. at 1194.
3 Eaton, supra note 29, at 1210. According to the comment, "[tihe single great legal barrier which precludes
investment banks and securities firms firom assuming commercial bank functions, section 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act,
which prohibits a company that underwrites and deals in securities from accepting demand deposits, has been
circumvented by organizational dodges and equivalency products." Id.
3 Id., at 1199 n.68. According to Eaton:
[t~he term "principally engaged" was originally defined by the Federal Reserve Board to mean that
the affiliate's gross revenues from an individual underwriting, and the affiliate's share of the total
market for the activity could not exceed five percent. Later, the percentage threshold for market share
was dropped, but the gross revenues cap was maintained.
Id. (citing Citicorp et al., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 473 (1987); Chemical N.Y. Corp. et al., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 731 (1987);
Bank of New England Corp., 74 Fed. Res. Bull. 133 (1988); Modifications to § 20 Orders, 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 751
(1989) (indicating the Federal Reserve Board's increase of the threshold to ten percent)).32 See Jaret Seiberg, 38 Banks Getting Head Start on Securities Business Series, AM. BANKER, May 10,
1996. (noting that the Federal Reserve permitted bank affiliates to engage in underwriting stocks, bonds and other
securities through the exemption found in section 20 of the Glass Steagall Act). The article further states "[t]he new
powers came with a price. The Fed required the banks to conduct the ... Section 20 affiliate, which must be cut off from
the bank. That means separate capitalization, no management interlocks, and no sharing of customer information." Id.
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IV FNAWCIALANALYSIS
A Three Key Ratdos
Three key ratios can be used to assess bank profitability. The first is return on assets (ROA) which
measures overall profitability of loans and investments, less costs of funding. The second ratio is the equity to
assets ratio. It measures the extent that shareholders' investment in the bank is leveraged into loans and
investments through deposits and other borrowings. Regulators require certain minimum levels of equity so that
banks are adequately capitalized. The third ratio is return on equity (ROE), which measures operating profit for
shareholders. Any two of these ratios can be used to mathematically determine the third.
ROA is a quick wayto determine how effective a bank is in making money on its investments. It can be
thought of as the net spread between what is earned on assets such as loans and the bank's cost of funds, increased
by fee income but then reduced by operating expense. In a way, a bank is comparable to a supermarket with high
volumes of activity but thin operating margins. Thus a 1.0% ROA is considered good performance, while 1.5% is
considered strong by industry standards. As a result of competitive factors, it is very difficult for banks to improve
their ROA beyond 1.5%. Competitive pressure on deposit and lending rates makes it difficult to improve
profitability. Banks can best improve their ROA's by becoming more efficient
B. MarketDynamic/rig Cyde
In the last five years, banks have had strong asset quality and profitability relative to the 1980's, which
were a time of severe credit troubles and volatile interest rates.33 As a result, since the 1980's, equity to asset ratios
have increased. In recent years, ROAs have been leveling off because of increased competition and the shrinking
33 William B. English & Brian K. Reid, Profits and Balance Sheet Developments at U.S. Commercial Banks
in 1994, Fed. Reserve Bull., June 1995, at 545 (indicating that banks were able to lower loan-loss provisions as loan
quality improved due to their past efforts to tighten credit standards).
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share of financial services held by banks which is discussed above. With limited growth, equity-to-assets ratios are
tending to rise, which tends to reduce a bank's ROE.
As ROAs stagnate, and as equity to assets ratios increase from retained earnings, ROEs have declined.
ROE is the most significant measure from a shareholder's perspective, however, as it indicates the return on their
stake in the bank. Banks have two ways to address this: (1) reduce their equityto-assets ratio through share
repurchases"' and (2) increase their ROA through increased efficiencies obtained in mergers.
C MergerAnalpss
I would like to take you through a hypothetical bank merger to make a few points. Exhibit A is a pro
forma income statement for a buying bank combined with a selling bank and related adjustments.
ExhibitA
Efficiency Gains and Revenue Enhancements
Buying Bank Selling Bank Adjustments Pro Forma
Net Interest Income $5,500 $2,150 $7,650
Loan Loss Provision (500) (100) - (600)
Non-interest income 1,000 400 100 1,500
Non-interest expense (4,50P) (1,700) 595 (5,605)
Taxes (33.3%) J (250O 232 _(982
Net Income S4
ROA 1.00% 1.25% - 1.40%
ROE 16.67% 16.67%
Number of shares 1,000 400
EPS $1.00 $1.25
This merger is driven by the synergies which can be obtained. The banks expct an increase of $100 from
additional fee income which can be obtained from providing additional services to the smaller bank's customers.
34 Id. According to this article, "some bank holding companies, finding that they had more capital than they
considered to be optimal, undertook share repurchase programs." Id.
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The recent First Union /First Fidelity merger is a good example of this dynamic. First Union believed that it could
deliver its broader range of fee-earning products through First Fidelity's branch network
The critical driver in many bank mergers is the expected cost savings which can be obtained. It is not
unusual for banks to hope and expect that by buying a target bank they can cut thirty-five percent of the target
bank's non-interest expense. In some acquisitions, banks even expect to get an even higher level of cost savings? 6
However, these cost savings came from branch closings and mass Iayoffs 3 As you can see, in our example, a
35% reduction in the selling bank's non-interest expense reduces the operating expense of the combined banks by
$595, or approximately 10% of pro fonna operating expense of $5,605. Together with the $100 increase in fee
income, the combined bank expects to have after-tax income of $1,963, which is 31% higher than what the two
banks would earn separately. The relatively large increase in net income is a result of a bank operating with small
profitability margins. Relatively small reductions in expense or increases in income can translate into large
increases in bottom-line profitability.
The effect of this from an acquisition standpoint can be demonstrated by an example (See Exhibit B). If
we assume that the selling bank has a share price with a 10.0 times price/earnings multiple before the acquisition, it
wiU tadeat$5,000 in ourhypothetical. But to abuyer this would represent a cost to the acquirer of only 5.2 times,
35 Nikhil Deogun, First Union Takeover of First Fidelity to Bring Terracciano Large Payments, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 5, 1995, at A9 (stating that First Union expects merger to boost reserves by $48 million); Steven Lipin, First
Union Agrees to Buy First Fidelity for $5.5 Billion: Swap Valued at $65 a Share; Combination to Create 7th-
Largest US. Bank WALL ST. J., June 19, 1995, at A3 (indicating that Fidelity relies too heavily on loans rather than
fees for its income). The article further states that First Union, with its mutual fund company and recently established
investment banking arm which offers corporate banking services such as derivatives and debt securities to middle-
market customers, "believes it could expand the sales of these products to First Fidelity's middle-market customers." Id
36 Joseph Radigan, Ten Weeks That Shook the World, US BANKER, Mar. 1, 1996, at 43 (stating that the
Chemical/Chase and First Union/First Fidelity deals are examples of how in-market mergers are driven by cost
reductions, the dominant force behind bank mergers); Nikhil Deogun, NationsBank Corp. Buys Bank South and
Layoffs Loom, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 1996, at B4 (indicating that top officials estimated a 60% reductions in expenses
when NationsBank announced its acquisition of Bank South Corp.).
37 John W. Milligan, The Fight for First Interstate, U.S. BANKER, Mar. 1, 1996, at 32. According to the
article, "[m]ost bank mergers rely on a simple formula: combine operations, fire huge numbers of employees to lower
costs and declare victory while Wall Street applauds:' Id.
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after factoring in the benefit of ssumed cost savings and revenue enhancements, which is incredibly cheap to the
buyer. For example, ifyou assume that the buying bank is itself tading at 10.0 times earnings, it can still buy the
selling bank and have an increase in per share earnings for its own shareholders. In fact, as you can see in Exibit
B, the buying bank can afford to pay nearly double the selling bank's share price and still have the acquisition be
"accretive" to the buying bank's shareholders.
The dynamic I have just outlined is common place in bank mergers. What it shows is that even well-
managed smaller banks can achieve significantly higher valuations as acquisition candidates than they can as
independent entities. If the selling bank has a 10 multiple, which is fairly typical if you do not have acquisition
"fluff' in a transaction, the selling bank would have a value of$5,000. You can add millions or billions this way, it
is the same dynamic.
Exhibit B
Pricing-Buyer's Point of View
Seller's Market Value Implied P/E Ratio Value to Buyer* Implied Price/Book
$5,000 10.Ox 5.2x 1.67x
$7,500 15.Ox 7.8x 2.50x
$10,000 20.Ox 10.4x 3.33x
* With assumed cost savings and revenue enhancements
Differences between pooling and purchase accounting treatment are important in structuring bank
acquisitions. In a pooling transaction, the target's balance sheet is simply added with the acquirer's balance sheet
without any adjustnents. In a purchase, assets must be marked to market and certain other adjustments must be
made which are not required in a pooling These differences can have a significant impact on a bank's required
regulatory capital levels and its future reported eamings. Exhibit C shows a
hypothetical pooling transaction. Pooling transactions require use of common stock as the acquisition currency, as
reflected below.
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Exhibit C
Pooling Accounting -Acquisition for Stock
Buying Bank Selling Bank Pro Forma
Assets
Cash $10,000 $4,000 $14,000
Securities 20,000 8,000 28,000
Loans 60,000 25,000 85,000
Premises 10,000 3 000 13-000
MUM0.O00 S140.00
Liabilities & Equity
Deposits $85,000 $34,000 $119,000
Other Borrowings 9,000 3,000 12,000
Equity 6000 3.000 90o00
Number of Shares 1,000 833 1,833
(at $9 share)
Exhibit D is an example of an all cash transaction using purchase accounting Here the buyer is paying
out $7,500 in cash, rather than issuing stock having a value of $7,500 as in the pooling hypothetical. Unlike the
case of a pooling in a purchase a bank's investment in securities, loans and premises is "marked-to-market" to
reflect current market value for these assets. These adjustments can sometimes be quite significant because of the
effects of interest rate changes and other factors. A purchase transaction will also result in goodwill, to the extent
that the consideration paid exceeds the fair market value of the assets acquired.
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ExhibitD*
Purchase Accounting-Acquisition for Cash
Buying Selling Adjustments Pro Forma
Bank Bank
Assets
Cash $10,000 $4,000 $(7,500) $6,500
Securities 20,000 8,000 (250) 27,750
Loans 60,000 25,000 (750) 84250
Premises 10,000 3,000 500 13,500
Goodwill - 5 000 5,0.0
s1$ $13.Q00
Liabilities & Equities
Deposits $85,000 $34,000 - $119,000
OtherBorrowings 9,000 3,000 - 12,000
Equity 6000 3$(3,000) 6000
Siam MMo
*Based on original 400
shares outstanding
This will often and almost always come up in a purchase transaction of a bank, usually because banks are being
sold at a premium to their book value.
Exhibit E shows the differences between reported earnings in a pooling and a purchasing situation.
ExhibItE
Pooling vs. Purchasing:
Effect on Reported Earnings
Pooling Further Purchase
Pro Forma Adjustments Pro Forma
Net Interest Income $7,650 $200 $7,850
Loan Loss Provision (600) - (600)
Non-Interest Income 1,500 - 1,500
Non-Interest Expense (5,605) (333) (5,938)
Taxes (33.3%) (981) 111 (870)
NetIncome $1,964 (222) $1,942
ROA 1.40% - 1.42%
ROE 21.81% - 32.37%
A pooling transaction will not have any effects on po forma income beyond the cost savings and revenue
enhancements described above. Further adjustments are ordinarly the case in a purchase. Goodwill must be
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amortized, which can provide certain tax benefits, but will almost always have a significant adverse effect on
reported GAAP earnings. Certain other adjustments must be made to reflect changes in the carrying values of
assets which have been marked-o-market
Purchase accounting was an important issue in the Fast Interstate transaction.s It was a disadvantage that
Wells Fargo had to overcome. I believe that it is going to be a major issue in future bank mergers. What I am
alluding to is that when you do a purchase, which is required in a hostile transaction, you must give yourself the
ability to buy back shares. This requires you to amortize the goodwill over time. Goodwill is a non-cash charge, a
single accounting entry.
It tends to punish a purchase transaction on a reported basis. With high equity-to-assets ratios, I believe you
are going to find more banks pursuing purchases instead. Although the reported earnings are lower, it allows the
purchaser to buy back shares.
The market has not fllly understood this concept When it is realized, you will find that more transactions
look better than they seem. This is because cash earnings are actually higher than the GAAP
reported earnings for a purchase transaction. To demonstrate this point Exhibit F shows another hypothetical
transaction.
38 See Roger Lowenstein, Intrinsic Value, A Modest Proposal to Stop 'Pooling, WALL ST. J, May 9, 1996, at
C1 (explaining that the advantage of using the 'pooling of interests' method of accounting for mergers rather than the
'purchase' method is purely cosmetic and that Wells Fargo, in an exception to the trend, used the purchase method in
acquiring First Interstate. Other banks are watching to see how shareholders react to this method of accounting for a
merger which has the effect of reducing reported net income for many years due to the amortization of goodwill).
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Exhibit F
Cash Acquisition
Buying Selling Buying Selling Buying Selling
Bank Bank BankAfter Bank Bank BankAfter
Before Before Pooling After After Purchase
Pooling Purchase
Net Income $1,000 $500 $1,071 $893 $1,942 -
Shares Outstanding 1,000 400 1,000 833 1,000 -
Pro Forma Ownership - - 55% 45% 100% -
CashEPS $1.00 $1.24 $1.07 $2.23 $1.94 -
Cash EPS Accretion - - 7% 123% 94% -
Multiple 9.Ox 10.Ox 9.Ox - 8.Ox -
Buyer Share Price $9.00 $9.64 - $15.54
Seller Share Price - $12.50 - $20.09 - 18.75
The buying bank earns one dollar a share and trades at a nine times multiple. The stock is thus trading at
nine dollars. The selling bank stock is trading at $12.50. This first shows a pooling transaction where the selling
bank shareholders get stock worth $20.09, but the buying bank's stock still appreciates to $9.64 because of the
synergies which can be obtained. A purchase transaction can be even more compelling, when adjusted for the
non.cash goodwill amortization which arises from purchase accounting
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CONCLUSION
As in every transaction, there are winners and losers. The winners are the shareholders of the banks and
the mortgage borrowers. The shareholders gain the increased capital gains in the stock price, and the mortgage
borrowers gain with decreased mortgage rates. Unfortunately, the losers are the employees and managers of the
target banks. Each consolidation transaction results in layoffs39 Therefore, the number of financial service
industry employees will continue to decline as consolidations occur in the future.
39 N.R. Kleinfield, The Downsizing of America: In the Workplace Musical Chairs; The Company as Family
No More, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1996, at Al (discussing the layoffs pursuant to the Chemical/Chase merger).
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